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SMART CONTRACTS AND TRADITIONAL 
CONTRACT LAW, OR: THE LAW OF THE VENDING 
MACHINE 
JONATHAN G. ROHR* 
ABSTRACT 
 
Smart contracts are the new norm, yet state legislatures and courts have not 
developed set rules and answers to legal disputes that these contracts create. Is 
traditional contract law sufficient? Or should we create an entirely new legislative or 
common law scheme to deal with these disputes? The common law has proven to be 
successful in dealing with new technologies and contracts, particularly because of its 
flexibility. Although a major overhaul may be in the future, there are still solutions 
that we can find today with the current legal landscape given the state of contract law 
and its evolution over time. One particularly analogous body of case law is instructive; 
the law of the vending machine. In the end, thinking about smart contracts as vending 
machines may be fruitful for the future of this evolving area of the law.  
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“Here the age of the machine is no mere abstraction; it presents itself in the 
shape of an instrument for the mass distribution of standard contracts.”1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In a relatively short period of time, “smart contracts” have entered the mainstream. 
Gone are the days in which excitement over blockchains and their ability to store code 
for automatic, future execution was the sole province of cypherpunks and other 
cryptography enthusiasts. Major players in a variety of sectors are beginning to 
consider the myriad ways that smart contracts, and distributed ledger technology more 
generally, can change the ways in which they transact business. A consortium of major 
banks—including HSBC, Barclays, and Credit Suisse—are collaborating on the 
development of a blockchain and smart contract based “settlement coin” designed to 
allow banks to clear and settle transactions between each other instantaneously.2 
                                                          
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Tennessee College of Law.  
 1  Steven v. Fid. & Cas. Co. of N.Y., 377 P.2d 284, 298 (Cal. 1962). 
 2  Michael Del Castillo, Barclays, HSBC Join Settlement Coin as Bank Blockchain Test 
Enters New Phase, COINDESK (Aug. 31, 2017), https://www.coindesk.com/hsbc-barclays-join-
utility-settlement-coin-as-bank-blockchain-test-enters-final-phase/. 
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Meanwhile, logistics experts are exploring the potential for smart contracts to 
streamline and automate supply chain management.3 
“Smart contract” is an unfortunate name for something that is not necessarily 
smart, or necessarily a contract. There is no official or universally accepted definition 
of the term,4 but everyone agrees that there is “code” involved and that this code will 
be self-executing upon the occurrence of certain conditions. Smart contracts are most 
commonly identified with the Ethereum blockchain, a public blockchain which 
supports a Turning-complete coding language,5 Solidity.6 For purposes of this Essay, 
I use the term “smart contract” in a general sense to refer to a computer protocol (code) 
that is stored on a blockchain (or distributed ledger) and which will be automatically 
executed by the nodes on the blockchain’s network upon the occurrence of specified 
conditions.7 Although they can be, smart contracts are not necessarily legal contracts,8 
a distinction I will discuss below. Because of blockchain’s immutability, smart 
contracts that have been uploaded to the blockchain take on a life of their own: they 
cannot be unilaterally stopped, delayed, or modified absent a fundamental change to 
the protocol of the blockchain on which the code resides or an “out” that was 
incorporated into the code from the outset.9  
Given the sudden and very recent rise of blockchain technology and the close 
relationship between smart contracts and blockchain, smart contracts have a patina of 
newness. At least on a theoretical level (if not with regard to actual execution), smart 
contracts are a few decades old.10 Nick Szabo, a legal scholar, software programmer, 
and cryptographer, first theorized and described smart contracts in a series of articles 
                                                          
 3  J. Dax Hansen et al., More Legal Aspects of Smart Contracts Application, PERKINSCOIE 
(March 13, 2018), https://www.perkinscoie.com/en/news-insights/more-legal-aspects-of-
smart-contract-applications.html;  Blockchain Smart Contracts for Supply Chain, GLOB. TRADE 
MAG. (July 24, 2017), http://www.globaltrademag.com/global-logistics/blockchain-smart-
contracts-supply-chains. 
 4  See Hansen et al., supra note 3. 
 5  “[A] Turing-complete programming language lets you specify any functionality that is 
possible to program into a Turing machine, an abstract model of a computer that is believed to 
be capable of computing any function that can be computed at all.” ARVIND NARAYANAN, ET 
AL., BITCOIN AND CRYPTOCURRENCY TECHNOLOGIES: A COMPREHENSIVE INTRODUCTION 263 
(2016). 
 6  PRIMAVERA DE FILIPPI & AARON WRIGHT, BLOCKCHAIN AND THE LAW 28 (2018); 
HENNING DIEDRICH, ETHEREUM: BLOCKCHAINS, DIGITAL ASSETS, SMART CONTRACTS, 
DECENTRALIZED AUTONOMOUS ORGANIZATIONS 211 (2016).  
 7  See, e.g., DE FILIPPI & WRIGHT, supra note 6, at 3; Christopher D. Clack et al., Smart 
Contract Templates: Foundations, Design Landscape and research directions, ARXIV (Mar. 15, 
2017), http://www.arxiv.org/abs/1608.00771; Josh Stark, Making Sense of Blockchain Smart 
Contracts, COINDESK (June 4, 2016), https://www.coindesk.com/making-sense-smart-
contracts/. 
 8  See, e.g., Hansen et al., supra note 3.  
 9  Jeremy M. Sklaroff, Note, Smart Contracts and the Costs of Inflexibility, 166 U. Pa. L. 
Rev. 263, 273 (2017); DIEDRICH, supra note 6, at 166–79.  
 10  Nick Szabo, Formalizing and Securing Relationships on the Public Networks, FIRST 
MONDAY (Sept. 1, 1997), http://firstmonday.org/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/548/469-
publisher=First.  
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he wrote in the mid-1990s.11 In what has become a canonical piece of writing for 
blockchain enthusiasts—Smart Contracts: Building Blocks for Digital Markets—
Szabo defined a smart contract as “a set of promises, specified in digital form, within 
which the parties perform on these promises.”12 In a subsequent essay—Formalizing 
and Securing Relationships on Public Networks—Szabo argued that smart contracts 
could “give[] us new ways to formalize and secure digital relationships which are far 
more functional than their inanimate paper-based ancestors.”13 Szabo’s definition is 
sufficiently broad to capture smart contracts that are legal contracts, as well as those 
that are not (e.g., gratuitous promises), but central to his conception is some feature 
that prevents a party from backing out of an obligation.14 In Szabo’s own words: “The 
basic idea behind smart contracts is that many kinds of contractual clauses (such as 
collateral, bonding, delineation of property rights, etc.) can be embedded in the 
hardware and software we deal with, in such a way as to make breach of contract 
expensive (if desired, sometimes prohibitively so) for the breacher.”15 For blockchain-
based smart contracts, this feature is the blockchain itself. Because blockchains are 
immutable, once the smart contract code resides on the blockchain, it will be executed 
when the specified conditions are satisfied, and because there is no central party with 
control over the blockchain, there will likely be no way to stop a smart contract from 
executing after it has been triggered.16 A party wanting to be sure that an obligation 
(contractual or not) will be performed, need only to verify that the necessary code 
exists on the blockchain.17  
The idea that an obligation—whether contractual or otherwise—can be 
incorporated into a digital form that makes violation of that relationship or obligation 
impossible or prohibitively expensive is not as esoteric as it may seem. As Szabo 
himself explained, we are all familiar with the “ancestor of smart contracts,” the 
“humble vending machine.”18 Anyone with an accepted means of payment can tender 
the stated price for a beverage. The machine itself has been coded with instructions to 
dispense specific outputs (certain beverages) in response to particular inputs (tender 
of payment and selection of the beverage).19 Breach by the purchaser is effectively 
                                                          
 11  See id. 
 12  Nick Szabo, Smart Contracts: Building Blocks for Digital Markets (1996), 
http://www.fon.hum.uva.nl/rob/Courses/InformationInSpeech/CDROM/Literature/LOTwinter
school2006/szabo.best.vwh.net/smart_contracts_2.html. 
 13  Szabo, supra note 10.   
 14  Id. 
 15  Szabo, supra note 12. In this passage, Szabo is clearly thinking in terms of traditional, 
legal contractual obligations. His point, however, is equally applicable to obligations that the 
law would not recognize as contractual. If I make a gratuitous promise to transfer a certain 
amount of cryptocurrency to a friend in 30 days, I can program a smart contract to execute that 
transfer and rely on a blockchain network to automatically execute it, even if—from a legal 
perspective—there is no “contract.” 
 16  DE FILIPPI & WRIGHT, supra note 6, at 75.  
 17  Id. at 74. 
 18  Szabo, supra note 10.  
 19  Id. 
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impossible. Breaking into a vending machine would require far more effort and 
involve far too much risk of detection than is justified by whatever would be gained 
from doing so. As Szabo explains:  
 
The vending machine is a contract with bearer: anybody with coins can 
participate in an exchange with the vendor. The lockbox and other security 
mechanisms protect the stored coins and contents from attackers, 
sufficiently to allow profitable deployment of vending machines in a wide 
variety of areas.20 
Given their potential to change the way that value is exchanged and economic 
relationships are consummated, the potential for smart contracts to change the way 
people and businesses enter into and perform legal contracts has received considerable 
attention from academics, practitioners, and industry participants alike.21 
Unsurprisingly, the status of smart contracts under traditional contract law has 
emerged as a topic of interest and one which will certainly require further treatment 
as the use of smart legal contracts grows.  
II. AN ONGOING ROLE FOR CONTRACT LAW 
In recent months, several state legislatures have turned their attention to smart 
contracts and have done so with an eye toward clarifying their validity under state 
law.22 In March of 2018, for example, Governor Bill Haslam of Tennessee signed 
legislation providing, among other things, that “smart contracts may exist in 
commerce. No contract relating to a transaction shall be denied legal effect, validity, 
or enforceability solely because that contract is executed through a smart contract.”23 
This language was adopted by Arizona in 2017.24 Nevada also adopted legislation in 
2017 that was intended to clarify the status of blockchain technology, including smart 
contracts.25 Lawmakers in several other states, including California,26 New York,27 
                                                          
 20  Id.  
 21  See, e.g., Kevin Werbach & Nicolas Cornell, Contracts Ex Machina, 67 DUKE L.J. 313, 
315 (2017); Nick Szabo, Smart Contracts: 12 Use Cases for Business & Beyond, CHAMBER OF 
DIG. COM. (Dec. 2016), https://digitalchamber.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/Smart-
Contracts-12-Use-Cases-for-Business-and-Beyond_Chamber-of-Digital-Commerce.pdf; 
Whitepaper: Smart Contracts and Distributed Ledger – A Legal Perspective, INT’L SWAPS & 
DERIVATIVES ASS’N (Aug. 2017), https://www.isda.org/a/6EKDE/smart-contracts-and-
distributed-ledger-a-legal-perspective.pdf.   
 22  See TENN. CODE. ANN. § 47-10-202 (2018); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-7061 (2018); 
S.B. 398, 2017 Leg., 79th Sess. (Nev. 2017); Assemb. B. 2658, 2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 
2018); Assemb. B. 8780, 2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2018); H.B. 5553, 100th Gen. Assemb., 
Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2018); L.B. 695, 105th Leg., 2d Sess. (Neb. 2018). 
 23  TENN. CODE. ANN. § 47-10-202 (2018). 
 24  ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-7061 (2018). 
 25  S.B. 398, 2017 Leg., 79th Sess. (Nev. 2017). 
 26  Assemb. B. 2658, 2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018).   
 27  Assemb. B. 8780, 2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2018).   
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Illinois,28 and Nebraska,29 have introduced legislation that is apparently intended to 
clarify the legal status of smart contracts.  
The merits of such legislation are far from clear: some industry participants, 
including the Chamber of Digital Commerce (a blockchain-focused trade association), 
argue that state legislation is unnecessary in light of existing law and that the 
piecemeal approach to the validity of blockchain-based transactions that would result 
from a state-by-state approach is undesirable.30 Together, the widely adopted Uniform 
Electronic Transactions Act (UETA) and the federal Electronic Signatures in Global 
and National Commerce Act (E-SIGN)31 establish that electronic signatures will 
satisfy any signature requirements imposed by law and, similarly, that electronic 
records will satisfy any requirement that records be kept in writing.32 These are 
technology-neutral statutes, and according to the critics of state-level smart contract 
legislation, these statutes already do the work of validating the use of blockchain 
technology and smart contract code for legal contracting.33 These statutes already 
provide that an otherwise enforceable contract is not rendered unenforceable because 
it is recorded electronically or was signed electronically.34 Critics of state-level smart 
contract legislation argue that a technology-specific formulation of this rule is 
unnecessary and potentially harmful.35 The debate of the usefulness and potential 
negative consequences of these state-level legislative efforts is for another day. This 
Essay concerns something that the state legislation, UETA, and E-SIGN have in 
common: their contemplation of an ongoing role for traditional contract law when 
parties rely on smart legal contracts.  
Despite bullish predictions from tech enthusiasts about the displacement of 
contract law, the ongoing role of humans in both formation and performance, when 
performance cannot be completely digitized, makes an ongoing role for contract law 
(and other legal regimes) likely if not unavoidable. Although there can be no doubt 
that smart contracts, especially as they become more sophisticated, are likely to “bring 
clarity, predictability, auditability, and ease of enforcement to contractual relations”36 
to some degree, they do not solve the fundamentally human limitations that preclude 
                                                          
 28  H.B. 5553, 100th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2018).   
 29  L.B. 695, 105th Leg., 2d Sess. (Neb. 2018).   
 30  UNIF. L. COMM’N, JOINT STATEMENT IN RESPONSE TO STATE “SMART CONTRACTS” 
LEGISLATION, [hereinafter ULC WHITE PAPER], https://digitalchamber.org/wp-
content/uploads/2018/04/Joint-Ltr-State-Smart-Contracts-Legislation.pdf.  This “Joint 
Statement” is signed by The Chamber of Digital Commerce, the Electronic Signature and 
Records Association, and one individual, Patricia Fry, who formerly chaired the Uniform 
Electronic Transactions Act Drafting Committee.  
 31  15 U.S.C. §§ 7001–7006.  
 32  See UNIF. ELEC. TRANSACTIONS ACT, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE 
LAWS (1999) [hereinafter UETA].. 
 33  ULC WHITE PAPER, supra note 30.  
 34  See 15 U.S.C. § 7001; UETA, supra note 32.  
 35  See ULC WHITE PAPER, supra note 30; Amy Davine Kim & Perianne Boring, State-by-
State Smart Contract Laws? If It Ain’t Broke, Don’t Fix It, COINDESK (Feb. 26, 2018), 
https://www.coindesk.com/state-state-smart-contract-laws-aint-broke-dont-fix/. 
 36  Hansen et al., supra note 3; see also DE FILIPPI & WRIGHT, supra note 6, at 81. 
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complete contracting, prevent the perfect memorialization of parties’ agreement, and 
lead human actors to fail to follow through on their obligations.37 Although some smart 
contracts will be “negotiated” by algorithms, many will not, and common strategies 
for dealing with the uncertainty of the future—such as reliance on open-ended 
standards phrased in general terms (i.e., reasonableness, best efforts, etc.)—do not 
necessarily lend themselves to representation in code.38 And, even when it may be 
possible to express a deal in only determinate, code-friendly terms, contracting parties 
might not want to, on account of strategic reasons for preferring to “specify contract 
terms at a high level of generality to allow for flexibility and discretion . . . .”39 Put 
simply, agreements that are sufficiently complete and specific to be expressed 
completely in code and executed completely on a blockchain network are not yet a 
serious possibility outside relatively simple and straightforward situations. Until 
artificial intelligence and other technologies make more complete contracting and the 
coding of open-ended terms possible, smart contracts are instead likely to arise as parts 
of larger contractual relationships in which only components have been coded as smart 
contracts.40 The world of perfectly complete contracts that are truly immune to breach 
is not here yet. Until it arises, disputes will arise and traditional contract law will 
provide at least one potential framework for their resolution.41 As discussed below, 
jurisdictional issues, difficulties related to the pseudonymity of the blockchain, as well 
as other consequences of the technology may make recourse to the courts difficult, but 
not impossible (at least as of yet). The application of traditional contract law to smart 
contracting technology will have to be worked out.  
There is no doubt that reliance on smart contracting technology as a substitute for 
traditional contracting will present a variety of issues under traditional contract law. 
Some commentators have gone so far as to argue that smart contracts will eventually 
displace contract law as it exists today.42 Nevertheless, as I argue in the remainder of 
this Essay, our traditional body of contract law has confronted many of the issues that 
smart contracts present—questions related to immutability, the inaccessibility of 
terms, the potential mismatch of terms as presented to the offeree, and how those terms 
are actually memorialized are all issues that have arisen in the context of earlier 
advancements in contracting technology.  
As several commentators have demonstrated, it is easy to conceive of a smart 
contract that meets the basic requirements of enforceability and is therefore a legal 
                                                          
 37  DE FILIPPI & WRIGHT, supra note 6, at 83. 
 38  Harry Surden, Computable Contracts, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 629, 683 (2012). 
 39  Id. 
 40  DE FILIPPI & WRIGHT, supra note 6, at 77; Josh Stark, How Close Are Smart Contracts 
to Impact Real-World Law?, COINDESK (April 11, 2016), 
https://www.coindesk.com/blockchain-smarts-contracts-real-world-law/; Whitepaper: Smart 
Contracts and Distributed Ledger – A Legal Perspective, supra note 21, at 14.  
 41  Mark Giancaspro, Is a ‘Smart Contract’ Really a Smart Idea? Insights from a Legal 
Perspective, 33 COMPUT. L. & SEC. REV. 825, 835 (2017) (“It is not yet entirely clear whether 
smart contracts are a smart idea, but there is little doubt the question will soon be tested in the 
courts.”); DE FILIPPI & WRIGHT, supra note 6, at 78–79. 
 42  See, e.g., Alexander Savelyev, Contract Law 2.0: ‘Smart’ Contracts as the Beginning of 
the End of Classic Contract Law, 26 INFO. & COMMC’N TECH. L. 116 (2017). 
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contract.43 There can be no doubt, however, that the legal decision makers faced with 
deciding disputes that arise from actual uses of smart contracts will face difficulties 
when applying traditional contract law to specific sets of real-world facts.44 This 
should come as no surprise. After all, “traditional contract law was based on the 
assumption that parties negotiate and sign paper contracts in face-to-face transactions, 
or after the exchange of offer and acceptance through the regular mail[.]”45 
Nevertheless, it is important not to overstate the possible tensions between contract 
law and its application to blockchain technology and smart contracts. This is not the 
first time that contract law has been confronted with innovations in the way that 
contracts are formed and performed: contracts of adhesion, “shrinkwrap” software 
licenses, and Internet contracting have all presented contract law with challenges, and 
in many instances, traditional contract law has been “more than resilient enough to 
handle the problems of the new era with ease.”46 As professors Moringiello and 
Reynolds show, the way that judges have responded to disputes involving Internet 
contracting is a particularly strong example of that resilience. Much litigation 
concerned situations where parties enter into contracts by clicking on an “I Agree” 
button or taking a similar action online. Then, one party claims that certain terms were 
not binding because he or she did not know about the terms at the time of contracting. 
Courts faced with determining whether such terms were binding initially looked to a 
framework that classified the formation into either “browsewrap” or “clickwrap,” 
depending on where the terms appeared and the steps that the offeree had to take to 
access the terms.47 In other words, courts developed technology-specific rules. More 
recently, however, courts have stepped away from this approach in favor of one that 
is more consistent with traditional contract law, focusing instead on unconscionability 
and the actual way that terms were presented to the offeree.48 
Contract law’s ability to incorporate new technology demonstrates the 
foundational concepts that do much of contract law’s heavy lifting—offer, acceptance, 
assent, etc. These concepts are flexible, especially in the hands of common law judges. 
When disputes that implicate new technology and contracting methods wind up in 
front of common law judges, the generality and flexibility of these doctrines give them 
the ability to make choices as to how the concepts apply to new technology or 
contracting methods.49 This was evident in the context of “shrinkwrap” software 
licenses. For example, early cases reached different conclusions as to when the 
contract came into existence and, therefore, whether terms that were available only 
after the point of sale were part of the parties’ bargain.50 Judges who confront smart 
                                                          
 43  DE FILIPPI & WRIGHT, supra note 6, at 78–79; Stark, supra note 40. 
 44  See generally Giancaspro, supra note 41. 
 45  Juliet M. Moringiello & William L. Reynolds, From Lord Coke to Internet Privacy: The 
Past, Present and Future of the Law of Electronic Contracting, 72 MD. L. REV. 452, 458 (2013). 
 46  Id. at 470. 
 47  Id. at 460. 
 48  Id. at 467–69. 
 49  Id. at 480. 
 50  Compare ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1453 (7th Cir. 1996) with Lively v. 
IJAM, Inc., 114 P.3d 487, 492 (2005) (Okla. Civ. App. 2005). 
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contracts will have similar flexibility to apply foundational contract law in different 
ways. The importance of this task is hard to understate, for it is the application of these 
principles to particular cases that will generate the legal rules relevant to the process 
by which parties utilize smart contracts in the context of legal contracting.  
By way of illustration, consider the “humble vending machine,” our prototypical 
smart contract. How would traditional contract formation concepts apply to this early 
smart contract as a legal contract? Clearly, a contract of sale has been formed and fully 
performed. It may seem silly to think of vending machine transaction in this way, but 
when, for example, someone is sickened by a defective can of Coke and issues arise 
relating to warranties that apply to the sales of goods, the legal status of these 
ubiquitous, small-potatoes transactions matters. In Chaffin v. Atlanta Coca Cola 
Bottling Co.,51 for example, the court held that because there was a contract of sale 
between a supermarket and the purchaser of a contaminated beverage from a vending 
machine placed by the supermarket on its premises, the implied warranty of 
merchantability was enforceable against the supermarket.52 That warranty was an 
implied term in a contract that was formed and performed through a vending 
machine.53  
As Chaffin makes clear, by the time the purchaser pops open the can of Coke, a 
valid contract of sale has been formed and performed, but what’s the offer and what’s 
the acceptance? At what point did anyone become bound? Or did anyone truly become 
bound in a meaningful sense? Perhaps, the buttons on the machine which display a 
beverage logo and price are each offers for the particular beverage displayed. If that’s 
the case, then perhaps the buyer’s acceptance occurs when he inserts the stated price 
and presses the right button. The machine performs by dispensing the can. At least one 
prominent practitioner has taken this position vis-à-vis offer and acceptance, 
explaining that if the machine took his dollar without providing a soda in return, there 
would be legal recourse for the lost dollar under a garden variety breach of contract 
claim.54  
No doubt, restitution (here return of the lost dollar) would be appropriate, but it is 
not the only measure of damages that would be available under traditional contract 
law. As was made clear in Hawkins v. McGee,55 plaintiffs with meritorious breach of 
contracts claims are typically entitled to be put in the same position they would have 
been in had the contract been performed.56 If you can manage to suspend your disbelief 
even further, suppose the disappointed purchaser would only be able to find a 
substitute beverage at a higher price than that advertised on the vending machine (say 
$1.50 whereas the non-performing machine displays a price of $1.00). If the contract 
is formed when the purchaser inserts the dollar (such that delivery of the goods 
pursuant to the contract), then the seller of the machine would be liable for the 
                                                          
 51  Chaffin v. Atlanta Coca Cola Bottling Co., 194 S.E.2d 513, 515 (Ga. Ct. App. 1972).  
 52  Id. 
 53  Id. 
 54  David M. Adlerstein, Are Smart Contracts Smart? A Critical Look at Basic Blockchain 
Questions, COINDESK (June 26, 2017) https://www.coindesk.com/when-is-a-smart-contract-
actually-a-contract/.  
 55  Hawkins v. McGee, 146 A. 641, 643 (N.H. 1929). 
 56  This is, of course, an expectation measure of damages. 
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difference between the substitution price and the price advertised in the offer even if 
the machine returned the dollar. This is the consequence of assigning particular legal 
significance (offer and acceptance) to those particular acts. It is not hard to imagine 
that a judge faced with deciding this issue could conclude that this result would be 
ridiculous and, instead, find that the display of the machine with prices and buttons is 
not an offer, but is instead a solicitation of offers to buy. Under this view, when a 
buyer inserts a dollar and makes a selection, he is making an offer to buy through the 
tender of payment. Acceptance occurs through performance—when the machine 
delivers the beverage, the contract is both formed and fully performed. Under this 
conception, if the machine has sold out of a particular beverage and it therefore returns 
the dollar when a purchaser selects that beverage, no breach has occurred because no 
contract was formed. Instead, the machine has rejected the offer.  
To the degree there is ever a need to fit the process by which someone buys a soda 
from a vending machine into the formal framework of contract formation (and there 
probably is not), the latter conception seems to comport with how people view their 
interactions with a vending machine—it is only when the machine retains the money 
without delivering the product that the purchaser views the machine and its owner as 
having some obligation that remains unfulfilled. My point, however, is that both of 
these approaches are possible under the traditional rules governing contract formation. 
Those rules, which were “based on the assumption that parties negotiate and sign paper 
contracts in face-to-face transactions, or after the exchange of offer and acceptance 
through the regular mail,”57 are malleable, especially when applied outside the factual 
contexts in which they were formulated.  
III. VENDING MACHINE CONTRACTING  
Consideration of the vending machine as a prototypical smart contract is not as 
silly as the example above makes it seem. Throughout its history, the vending machine 
has acted as much more than a delivery mechanism for junk food and other sundries. 
Instead, a variety of high-value contracts have been, and still are, concluded through 
vending machines or similar automated machine-based processes.58 Take, for 
example, contracts between parking lot/garage owners and car owners seeking 
parking. These are routinely formed through a form of vending machines that dispense 
tickets. These are common transactions, but significant when you remember what they 
are: contracts of bailment in which valuable property is placed in the possession of 
someone other than its owners in exchange for payment. And, they are formed and 
primarily performed through what is fundamentally a very basic smart contract.  
Similarly, for several decades during the early years of the commercial air travel, 
insurance companies offered flight insurance to travelers wishing to secure life 
insurance for the possibility of a plane crash or other accident.59 These policies became 
so popular that the insurance companies eventually began to offer them through 
                                                          
 57  Moringiello & Reynolds, supra note 45, at 458. 
 58  See, e.g., Nick Wingfield, Buying an iPod from a Vending Machine—Airports, Hotels 
Add Models That Dispense Pricey Electronics; Reebok's Sneaker Experiment, WALL ST. J. 
(Sept. 1, 2005), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB112553715483028640. 
 59  See Paula Mejia, Vending Machines in the U.S. Once Dispensed More Than Chips and 
Cookies, ATLAS OBSCURA (Dec. 13, 2017), https://www.atlasobscura.com/articles/vending-
machines-snacks-same-united-states. 
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vending machines placed next to the boarding gates in airports around the country.60 
Although the premiums paid for these policies were low, policy limits were not 
insignificant. Denials of coverage led to litigation which led to a body of case law in 
which common law judges grapple with the need to apply traditional contract law to 
an automated contracting process.  
As I argue in this Section, despite the very real technological differences between 
vending machines and the smart contracts of today (and tomorrow), the issues that 
arise in many of the vending machine cases are surprisingly predictive of the types of 
issues that are certain to arise as judges attempt to apply foundational common law 
contract principles to smart contracts going forward. Immutability, timing of 
formation, incongruities between the terms that were advertised and the “actual” 
terms, and a variety of other issues related to intent all appear in these cases. 
Take, for example, the famous English contracts case, Thornton v. Shoe Lane 
Parking, Ltd.,61 which finds three members of the Court of Appeal, including the 
renowned Lord Denning, struggling with the implications of automated contract 
formation—that is to say contract formation that takes place through a type of vending 
machine. At issue in Shoe Lane Parking was whether a contract formed through a 
parking garage’s ticket machine included a provision releasing the garage from 
liability for injuries suffered by patrons while on the premises.62 The procedure is 
familiar to anyone who has parked at the airport: when someone drove into the garage, 
he or she would retrieve a ticket from the machine positioned at the gate. This ticket 
stated the time the person entered the garage, explained how payment should be made 
upon exit, and also stated that the ticket was subject to the “conditions of issue as 
displayed on premises.”63 These conditions were posted behind the ticket machine and 
also in the office where the cashier responsible for accepting payment was stationed.64  
The plaintiff, Mr. Francis Charles William Thornton, a “free-lance trumpeter of 
the highest quality,” parked his car at the garage to perform an engagement with the 
BBC.65 When he returned to retrieve his car, he was severely injured in an accident 
that was found to be partly the garage’s fault.66 To avoid liability, the garage cited a 
condition which eliminated liability for personal injury to garage customers that was 
listed on the notices that were posted behind the ticket machine and in the cashier’s 
office.67 The garage argued that the contract between it and Mr. Thornton included the 
liability-eliminating term because the ticket dispensed by the machine stated that its 
issuance was subject to conditions.68  
In his opinion, Lord Denning acknowledged the possibility of following the “ticket 
cases of former times [that] were concerned with railways, steamships, and 
                                                          
 60  Id. 
 61  Thornton v. Shoe Lane Parking, Ltd. [1971] 2 QB 163 at 165. 
 62  Id. 
 63  Id. at 168. 
 64  Id. at 168. 
 65  Id. at 167.  
 66  Id.. 
 67  Id. at 167–68. 
 68  Id. 
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cloakrooms.”69 As Lord Denning explained, in those cases the company’s issuance of 
a ticket through an employee constitutes the offer,  and the customer’s conduct in 
taking the ticket without lodging any objections as to the terms constitutes the 
acceptance of that offer.70 These cases, however, have no “application ticket which is 
issued by an automatic machine.”71 The “former ticket cases” all involved tickets 
issued by a real-life human being—an employee of the company issuing the ticket. 
Lord Denning explained that those cases were predicated on the possibility that a 
customer could ask the ticketing agent questions, refuse the ticket, and demand a 
refund.72 However, this same opportunity does not exist when an “automatic machine” 
issues the ticket: 
He [the customer] cannot get his money back. He may protest to the 
machine, even swear at it. But it will remain unmoved. He is committed 
well beyond recall. He was committed at the very moment when he put his 
money into the machine. The contract was concluded at that time.73  
For this reason, the offer and acceptance framework of the “former ticket cases” 
should not apply. Instead, in the case of an automatic machine, the offer occurs when 
the owner of the machine makes it available to customers as ready to accept payment. 
The terms of the offer are those that are communicated through the sign that is placed 
on or close to the machine explaining what the customer will receive in exchange for 
payment. Acceptance occurs when the customer activates the machine and enters the 
garage.74 Issuance of the ticket by the machine occurs after the contract is formed, so 
in the event the ticket conflicts with the terms that appeared on the sign or notice, the 
contents of the notice will control because it is the terms on the notice to which the 
customer assented. Under this framework, the relevant notice was the sign located at 
the entrance to the garage which listed the prices and said, “All cars parked at the 
owner’s risk.” because this was the sign that was displayed prior to Mr. Thornton’s 
decision to proceed into the garage, which caused the machine to “thrust [the ticket] 
at him.”75 Conditions purportedly included in contract through incorporation by 
reference on the ticket could not be a part of the contract because those conditions 
were not part of the offer.76  
Lord Denning’s co-panelists were not prepared to reach a definitive answer as to 
the moment that a contract came into existence. For this reason, Lord Megaw (and 
also Lord Denning in another part of his opinion) addressed the issue under the 
framework provided by the “former ticket cases,” which ultimately involved 
determining whether the garage took reasonably sufficient steps to give Mr. Thornton 
                                                          
 69  Id. at 169. 
 70  Id. 
 71  Id. 
 72  Id. 
 73  Id.  
 74  Id. 
 75  Id. 
 76  Id. 
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notice of the condition.77 All judges agreed that, under the standard applicable to the 
ticket cases, it had not.78  
Sir Willmer’s short opinion is notable insofar as he directly addressed the 
significance of the vending machine, which he calls the “really distinguishing feature 
of this case.”79 Although he was not willing to say precisely when a contract arises, he 
acknowledged the distinction between contracting through a ticket agent (in which 
there is at least the “notional opportunity” for the customer to refuse once he learns of 
the conditions) and contracting through a machine, in which “there is something quite 
irrevocable about the process.”80 Like Lord Denning, Sir Willmer is attuned to the 
relationship between the timing of contract formation and the terms that are included 
in that contract in terms that have obvious implications for smart contracts: “[A]ny 
attempt to introduce conditions after the irrevocable step has been taken of causing the 
machine to operate must be doomed to failure.”81 
On this side of the pond, courts have confronted the significance of vending 
machine contracting most often in the context of aviation insurance coverage 
disputes.82 During the early decades of commercial air travel insurance companies 
offered nervous passengers the opportunity to purchase flight insurance policies from 
vending machines stationed in airports.83 A passenger seeking to purchase a policy 
would insert the premium into the machine, receive policy documentation in return, 
and then provides the required information (name, flight, etc.).84 The [court] describes 
the process:  
The vending machine is so constructed that when a 25 cent coin is inserted 
in a slot provided for the purpose, it ejects an original policy and retains a 
duplicate for the company’s record. The person operating the machine fills 
out a space provided on the machine, the name and address of the person 
who is operating it, the name and address of the beneficiary, the place of 
departure and the destination. The machine itself records the date when the 
policy is issued, the time of day and amount of coverage.85  
As in Shoe Lane Parking, these cases focus on whether particular terms that are 
purportedly part of the contract are enforceable against a party who very likely had no 
notice of them prior to operating the vending machine.86 Unsurprisingly for a body of 
insurance coverage cases, these disputes focus on attempts by aviation insurers to deny 
                                                          
 77  Id. at 170. 
 78  Id. at 174. 
 79  Id. 
 80  Id. 
 81  Id.  
 82  See, e.g., Slater v. Fid. & Cas. Co., 98 N.Y.S.2d 28, 29 (N.Y. App. Div. 1950); Steven v. 
Fid. & Cas. Co., 377 P.2d 284, 298 (Cal. 1962).  
 83  See Slater, 98 N.Y.S.2d at 29; Steven, 377 P.2d at 298. 
 84  Slater, 98 N.Y.S.2d at 29. 
 85  Id.  
 86  Id. at 30.  
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coverage. Also consistent with Shoe Lane Parking is the importance of the steps taken 
to bring the relevant terms to the insured’s attention prior to the insured’s decision to 
insert coins into the vending machine.  
For example, in Roberts v. Fidelity and Casualty Company of New York,87 the 
Ninth Circuit affirmed a judgment in favor of the insurer in light of (1) the availability, 
outside the vending machine, of a specimen policy that included a bold notice of the 
relevant limitation of coverage and, (2) a prominent display on the front of the vending 
machine which said “COVERS FIRST ONE-WAY OR ROUND TRIP FLIGHT (IF 
COMPLETELY TICKETED PRIOR TO ORIGINAL DEPARTURE) WITHIN 12 
MONTHS ON ANY SCHEDULED AIR CARRIER TO ANY PART OF THE 
WORLD.”88 The insured purchased the policy before traveling from Portland to Los 
Angeles. After arriving in Los Angeles, the insured purchased a round-trip helicopter 
trip from Los Angeles to Disneyland. The insured person was killed when the 
helicopter crashed. Given the prominent display that explained the scope of coverage 
and the bolded notice of the exclusion in the specimen policy, the court upheld the 
insurer’s denial of coverage.89 Similarly, when the vending machine included a notice 
on its exterior advising purchasers of a $25,000 aggregate limit and instructing them 
not to purchase insurance above that amount, an insured who purchased more than 
$25,000 could not enforce the policies in excess of that amount.90 The insurer, of 
course, returned the $0.75 premium that the insureds inserted into the machine to 
purchase the excessive, void coverage.91  
In Lachs v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New York,92 the New York Court of Appeals 
refused to enforce a provision limiting coverage to injuries sustained in connection 
with tickets purchased from “a Scheduled Airline.”93 The vending machine advertised 
itself as offering “Airline Trip Insurance” and included information relating to the 
premiums for coverage, aggregate limits, and basic scope of coverage.94 The machine 
was positioned directly next to the counter at which all passengers flying on Non-
Scheduled Airline Carriers (i.e., those to which the coverage limitation would apply) 
received their tickets.95 Under these facts, the court of appeals held that a reasonable 
jury could find that the actual agreement was for “Airline Trip Insurance” that was not 
limited to particular classes or categories of airlines.96 In a case also involving a 
scheduled airline limitation, the California Supreme Court similarly refused to apply 
the provision.97 There, the non-scheduled flight was arranged by the ticketing airline 
                                                          
 87  Roberts v. Fid. & Cas. Co., 452 F.2d 981, 985 (9th Cir. 1971).  
 88  Id. at 985. 
 89  Id. 
 90  Slater, 98 N.Y.S.2d at 30. 
 91  Id. at 30.. 
 92  Lachs v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 118 N.E.2d 555, 557 (N.Y. 1954).  
 93  Id. 
 94  Id. 
 95  Id. at 558. 
 96  Id. 
 97  Steven v. Fid. & Cas. Co., 377 P.2d 284, 286 (Cal. 1962). 
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to accommodate the decedent/insured’s need to make a connection after a leg of his 
original flight was canceled, and “the facts of the case foreclose[d] any contention of 
the company that it afforded Mr. Steven plain warning of non-coverage of the . . . 
flight.”98  
In both of these cases, common law judges grappled with the automation of the 
formation process and the effect it should have on their approach to the disputes in 
front of them. Writing for the California Supreme Court, Justice Tobriner explains:  
We must view the instant claim in the composite of its special and unique 
circumstances. To equate the bargaining table, where each clause is the 
subject of debate, to an automatic vending machine, which issues a policy 
before it can even be read, is to ignore basic distinctions. The proposition 
that the precedents must be viewed in the light of the imperatives of the age 
of the machine has become almost axiomatic. Here the age of the machine 
is no mere abstraction; it presents itself in the shape of an instrument for 
the mass distribution of standard contracts.99 
Notable in this passage is the reference to precedent—Justice Tobriner is not 
calling for new rules or principles. Instead, he is calling for a careful application of 
existing precedents to new circumstances. 
Echoing Lord Denning, Judge Conway of the New York Court of Appeals 
approached the issue, in part, through a foundational principle of traditional contract 
doctrine, the “meeting of the minds.”100 Like Lord Denning, Judge Conway is 
concerned with the effect that the substitution of an automated contracting process has 
on assent and the content of the parties’ agreement: 
No doubt it is advisable, if not indeed necessary, as a matter of business 
competition to sell insurance policies from automatic vending machines. . 
. . However, there must be a meeting of the minds achieved between the 
applicant and the company through an application and signs and lettering, 
for while the applicant has a mind the machine has none and cannot answer 
questions. If the defendant had paid for a living salesman, the decedent 
would not have purchased the insurance if it did not cover her trip or she 
might have purchased it and changed her plane.101 
Notice just how closely Judge Conway tracks Lord Denning. Contracts require 
mutual assent or a “meeting of the minds” even when formed through an automated 
process like a vending machine. Aspects of that formation process which prevent the 
policyholder from having an opportunity to understand what they are agreeing to can 
prevent a contract from forming.  
Obviously, the smart contracts today and tomorrow are, and will be, more 
complicated and complex than the “humble vending machine,” thereby presenting a 
myriad of issues. Nevertheless, the parallels are surprising. Immutability, practical 
barriers to comprehension of terms and this body of vending machine cases shows that 
traditional contract law doctrine does offer some tools for dealing with the general 
                                                          
 98  Id. at 294. 
 99  Id. at 298. 
 100  Lachs, 118 N.E.2d at 559. 
 101  Id. 
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issues raised by the use of smart contracts and automation in the context of legal 
contracting.  
IV. SMART CONTRACT AS LEGAL CONTRACT  
To further consider the application of traditional contract law to smart contracts, 
consider as an example, issues related to intent and assent that are created by 
attempting to express a contract in code. If contracting parties cannot “read” code, 
how do we know what they are assenting to? To be sure, the introduction of code and 
blockchain introduces factual complications. But, whether it is because the terms of a 
contract are expressed in code, or because they are concealed in a vending machine 
and can be fully accessed only after the customer has taken the irreversible step of 
inserting payment, the fundamental issue is, and will be, the same—whether terms that 
a contracting party claims not to have agreed to are part of the “deal,” or stated 
differently, whether the memorialization of the contract represents the terms that a 
contracting party agreed to.   
When parties use smart contract code to automate only part of a larger contractual 
arrangement, divergences between their natural language conception of contractual 
obligations, and the way those obligations are coded, should be relatively easy to 
address, provided, of course, that there is something establishing that the parties’ 
agreement exists outside the code and that the parties actually agreed to something 
other than what was coded.102 Here, the code is likely to be viewed as a component of 
performance that one party will attempt to prove is nonconforming. Of course, it may 
be impossible to “undo” a smart contract in a literal sense, but a court called upon to 
adjudicate a dispute over smart contract code that has executed could order other 
remedial measures. 
When, however, the code purports to be the parties’ entire agreement, traditional 
contract law offers a variety of ways to look at the situation. Depending on the facts 
in any particular case, legal decision makers will have options. Courts could focus on 
objective assent to the code through the action that triggers the smart contract (e.g., 
sending digital currency to a particular address), in effect treating the smart contract 
code as a natural language contract whose terms are binding upon a party who has 
objectively indicated assent to them whether they understand or have even read them. 
Courts applying this line of reasoning hold that individuals who sign contracts in 
languages that they do not read, write, or understand are still bound to the terms in the 
contract.103 
Or, given the likelihood, or perhaps certainty, that some representations were made 
about the effects of the code (at least in situations where the decision to enter into a 
contractual relationship that is embodied in code is made by a human and not an 
algorithm), courts could focus on any divergences between those representations and 
the actual code. Recall Lord Denning’s approach in Shoe Lane Parking. The garage 
claimed that the terms included the conditions that were located in areas that were not 
easily accessible prior to the point of ticketing, but Lord Denning would hold that the 
terms only included those advertised on the notice outside the garage, that individuals 
                                                          
 102  Whitepaper: Smart Contracts and Distributed Ledger – A Legal Perspective, supra note 
21, at 10–11. 
 103  See, e.g., Morales v. Sun Construction, Inc., 541 F.3d 218, 222 (3d Cir. 2008). 
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wishing to park their car could see prior to making the decision to take a ticket.104 This 
is functionally the same approach as those taken by courts that refused to enforce 
“surprise” terms in the flight insurance policies sold through vending machines.105 
Other common law doctrines could play a role in resolving these issues in particular 
disputes. It is not hard to imagine situations in which fraudulent misrepresentations as 
to the content of the code were made, giving the aggrieved party a basis to terminate 
the contract. Unconscionability could very well provide another avenue under the right 
facts. 
Digital token sales offer a helpful example for thinking through these issues in a 
more concrete way and demonstrate that traditional contract law does provide a robust 
set of tools for resolving the issues that smart contracts implicate. Since 2016, tech 
entrepreneurs have increasingly looked to the sale of blockchain-based tokens to 
finance the development of new platforms, networks, and online services.106 In many 
instances, these entrepreneurs forego traditional business entities, instead forming 
loose associations with one another.107 The tokens that are sold to members of the 
public are hosted on public blockchains, usually the Ethereum blockchain, and are 
paired with smart contracts to confer a variety of rights on the owner of the token.108 
These rights can include economic rights (i.e., entitlement to a percentage of revenue 
or profit generated by the enterprise), utility rights (i.e., entitlement to use the software, 
platform, or service when and if it is operational), and even governance/participation 
rights (i.e., entitlement to vote on certain decisions). Currently, the most pressing legal 
issues related to these sales are related to categorization for regulatory purposes—are 
they securities? Commodities? Digital goods? Regardless of the status for regulatory 
purposes, they appear to be contractual in the legal sense. Sellers of tokens offer to the 
public a bundle of rights that has been digitized. Purchasers accept and transfer 
value—usually virtual currency—in exchange for the token.109  Of course, to sell 
tokens, sellers have to give prospective purchasers more information about the project 
being funded by the proceeds of a token sale, as well as the bundle of rights associated 
with a token.110 It has become standard for development teams to release white papers 
that include this information and also to post a variety of other materials, such as 
explanatory videos, online.111 
As one of the most famous token-funded enterprises makes clear, token sellers are 
aware of the potential legal issues that could arise if there are divergences between the 
                                                          
 104  Thornton v. Shoe Lane Parking, Ltd. [1971] 2 QB 163 at 168.  
 105  See, e.g., Roberts v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 452 F.2d 981, 983 (9th Cir. 1971); Steven v. 
Fidelity & Cas. Co., 377 P.2d 284, 286 (Cal. 1962); Lachs, 118 N.E.2d at 557; Slater v. Fidelity 
& Cas. Co., 98 N.Y.S.2d 28, 29 (N.Y. App. Div. 1950). 
 106  Jonathan Rohr & Aaron Wright, Blockchain-Based Token Sales, Initial Coin Offerings, 
and the Democratization of Public Capital Markets, CARDOZO LEGAL STUD. RES. PAPER NO. 
527, UNIV. OF TENN. LEGAL STUD. RES. PAPER NO. 338 (Oct. 4, 2017), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3048104. 
 107  Id. at 30. 
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code and representations made about the tokens being sold. The DAO, one of the first 
decentralized autonomous organizations, was an investor directed venture capital fund 
that was funded through the sale of DAO Tokens.112 For a period of time in 2016, it 
was possible to purchase a DAO Token by sending digital currency to a specified 
account on the Ethereum blockchain and receive, in return, DAO Tokens which could 
be subsequently transferred to other accounts.113 Holders of DAO Tokens were entitled 
both to vote on The DAO’s investment decisions, and to receive a portion of the 
proceeds generated by successful investments, hence its characterization as an 
“investor focused venture capital fund.”114 The DAO was organized by Slock.it (a 
technology company) and a group of high-level Slock.it employees, including its 
Chief Technology Officer Christoph Jentzsch.115 Only a few months after The DAO’s 
successful fundraising round in which over $150 million was raised, someone 
exploited a “recursive call bug” in The DAO’s code and was able to divert around $50 
million worth of ether from The DAO’s address.116 
Soon after the diversion of funds became public knowledge, it became common to 
refer to the incident as a “hack” of The DAO.117 But, an open letter that was ostensibly 
from the culprit took issue with this characterization. Instead, the Attacker (as the letter 
was signed) argued that because the code allowed this action, it was a perfectly 
legitimate and legal course of action.118 In support of this claim, the Attacker cited a 
provision in The DAO’s Terms of Use which purported to limit the terms governing 
The DAO to only terms that were included in the code: 
The terms of The DAO Creation are set forth in the smart contract code 
existing on the Ethereum blockchain at [string of characters denoting 
digital address]. Nothing in this explanation of terms or in any other 
document or communication may modify or add any additional obligations 
or guarantees beyond those set forth in The DAO’s code. Any and all 
explanatory terms or descriptions are merely offered for educational 
purposes and do not supercede or modify the express terms of The DAO’s 
code set forth on the blockchain; to the extent you believe there to be any 
conflict or discrepancy between the descriptions offered here and the 
functionality of The DAO’s code at [string of characters denoting digital 
                                                          
 112  A variety of sources provide an overview of the DAO and its demise. See, e.g., DE FILIPPI 
& WRIGHT, supra note 6; Carla L. Reyes, Nizan Geslevich Packin, & Benjamin P. Edwards, 
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address], The DAO’s code controls and sets forth all terms of The DAO 
Creation.119  
Notably, the Attacker threatened legal action against anyone who would attempt 
to undo the diversion of funds in reliance on this provision, apparently under the 
assumption that a court would enforce this provision in a way that would “bless” the 
diversion of funds—after all, everyone “agreed” to the code that allowed this to 
happen.120 As an analysis of The DAO’s terms that appeared in Bitcoin Magazine 
almost immediately after the incident demonstrates, there are a number of other 
provisions that would be relevant to any attempt to address the losses suffered by 
owners of DAO Tokens under traditional contract law.121 The provision referenced 
above (let’s call it the “Code Controls” provision) appeared in the Terms of Use that 
were on Daohub.org, which included, among other things, a limitation of liability 
provision in which token holders agree not to hold “third parties or individuals 
associated with The DAO Creation liable for any and all damages or injury whatsoever 
caused by or related to use of, or inability to use, DAO Tokens . . . ”122 Other potential 
reasons appear in the readme.md file at the Slock.it Github, which provides The 
Decentralized Autonomous Organization DAO Framework.123 The Framework 
addresses a variety of legal issues, including the possibility that DAO Tokens were 
securities, and includes a provision purporting to opt-out of contract law altogether: 
Your use of the Software does not, in and of itself, create a legally binding 
contract in any jurisdiction and does not establish a lawyer-client 
relationship. Your communication with a non-lawyer will not be subject to 
the attorney-client privilege and (depending on your jurisdiction) may not 
be entitled to protection as confidential communication.124 
Suppose “The Attacker” had, in fact, attempted to enforce the Code Controls 
provision against holders of DAO Tokens and individuals associated with Slock.it 
who pushed for the hard fork that allowed the diversion to be unwound. Or, suppose 
DAO Token holders brought breach of contract actions against the organizers of 
Slock.it for delivering tokens (or, more precisely, causing The DAO address to issue 
tokens) that deviated from the specifications included in the various materials 
describing the tokens and their functionality (presumably, none of these materials 
mentioned the bug that would allow a single Ethereum address to siphon $50 million 
worth of assets from The DAO). Or, suppose an enterprising and aggrieved holder of 
DAO Tokens discovered The Attacker’s real-world identity and brought a breach of 
contract action alleging that, notwithstanding the fact that the code allowed the 
diversion to occur, The Attacker’s exploitation of this mistake violated the terms that 
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everyone (including The Attacker) actually agreed to when they purchased DAO 
Tokens. 
These hypothetical claims raise a variety of legal issues that are not strictly 
contractual. Agency law (i.e., whether the account that issued DAO Tokens will be 
treated as an agent of Slock.it or individuals associated with its creation),125 and 
standing and partnership law, which will both impact whether individual DAO Token 
Holders can sue in their own capacity, are perhaps the most obvious. They also raise 
practical issues, such as the claims against The Attacker and the need to determine 
her, his, or their real world identity. Putting these aside for the time being, consider 
the issues that would arise under traditional contract law and whether that body of law 
offers principles and rules that are capable of handling the issues in a sensible way. 
For example, would a court enforce the Code Controls provision? In other words, 
would a judge hold that this provision in the Terms of Use precludes the DAO Token 
Holders’ argument that the diversion of funds was improper from a contractual 
perspective because they allowed it? Said another way, would a court adopt the 
position advanced in “The Attacker’s” open letter, which relies upon the Code 
Controls provision? Ultimately, the question is a familiar one—what terms are part of 
the parties’ agreement? On one hand, notions of objective assent could lead a legal 
decision-maker to determine that, when individuals sent ether to the DAO address in 
exchange for tokens, they were manifesting assent to the terms as embodied in the 
code and only the terms embodied in the code, whether they understood the terms or 
not. However, as the vending machine and other cases show, other concepts related to 
assent and meeting of the minds would give legal decision-makers a path to holding 
that the agreement includes only those terms that were reasonably available to DAO 
Token holders prior to purchase. This position would be bolstered by the fact that the 
Code Controls provision itself exists outside of the code; reliance on the Code Controls 
provision in a sense concedes the need to look outside the code aspects of the relevant 
agreement. The parallel to the vending machine cases is obvious; once a purchaser 
sent ether to the DAO account during the funding window, it cannot be undone. This 
is the nature of the blockchain. Lord Denning’s observation about the irrevocability 
of vending machine contracts are oddly resonant here:  
He [the customer] cannot get his money back. He may protest to the 
machine, even swear at it. But it will remain unmoved. He is committed 
well beyond recall. He was committed at the very moment when he put his 
money into the machine. The contract was concluded at that time.126  
Determining which terms are part of the contract would, no doubt, present 
complicated factual issues, some of which result from the innovative technology. 
Nevertheless, at its core, the question of which terms are part of the contract when 
there are multiple potential sources of those terms is an issue that has arisen before in 
other contexts. The principles that have applied in the context of vending machines, 
shrinkwrap, and Internet contracting are sufficiently general to be applicable here and 
will provide judges with considerable flexibility in the way that they apply those 
principles to particular disputes. 
                                                          
 125  See, e.g., Samir Chopra & Laurence White, Artificial Agents and the Contracting 
Problem, U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 363, 402 (2009).  
 126  Thornton v. Shoe Lane Parking, Ltd. [1971] 2 QB 163 at 169. 
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What about the provision in The DAO Framework which purports to prevent the 
creation of a contract in the first instance? Again, the need to look outside the code for 
this term undercuts the Code Controls provision, but the issue presented by the “No 
Contract Provision” is not a new one. Instead, there is an entire doctrine which deals 
with the relevance of parties’ intent (or lack of intent) to imbue an agreement or 
obligation with legally binding status.127 The doctrine even has its own section in the 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts.128 Under the American rule, intent to form a 
legally binding contract is not required to form a contract (i.e., it is possible to form a 
legally binding contract without even knowing that such a thing exists), but “a 
manifestation of intention that a promise shall not affect legal relations may prevent 
the formation of a contract.”129 As the case law demonstrates, statements disclaiming 
contractual liability will be enforced in many instances,130 but notions of fairness play 
a considerable role, especially when one side has performed or relinquished something 
of value.131 Again, the relevant facts may be complicated and require an understanding 
of new technology, but the fundamental questions relating to the 
availability/accessibility of the disclaimer, fairness concerns over its potential 
enforcement, and its consistency with other terms, including potentially the Code 
Controls provision, are familiar. 
A final observation with regard to the applicability of traditional contract law to 
the DAO incident. Were it possible for DAO Token holders or organizers of The DAO 
to discover the real-world identity of The Attacker and institute a breach of contract 
suit under American law, contract law may very well provide the answer to The 
Attacker’s reliance on the Code  Controls provision. Even if a court were inclined to 
enforce it, there is a mandatory duty of good faith and fair dealing that is implied in 
every contract.132 While it is typically conceived of as a narrow duty, the actions of 
The Attacker seem to fall squarely within the type of opportunistic behavior that the 
implied duty is intended to circumscribe. As traditionally formulated, the implied duty 
prohibits conduct which violates the “spirit”133 of the bargain, or which prevents 
counterparties from enjoying the “benefits of the agreement.”134 There can be no 
question that neither the organizers of The DAO, nor the non-Attacker token holders, 
intended for participants to be able to siphon off funds in the way that The Attacker 
did. In our hypothetical breach of contract litigation over The Attacker’s conduct, a 
court inclined to take a strict reading of the Code  Controls provision could find that 
the implied duty applies in the same way that it applies to written, natural language 
contracts that include merger and integration clauses intended to limit contractual 
terms to only those in the writing. 
                                                          
 127  See, e.g., Gregory Klass, Intent to Contract, 95 VA. L. REV. 1437, 1442–43 (2009). 
 128  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 21 (AM. L. INST. 1981). 
 129  Id. 
 130  See, e.g., Lebrecht v. Deep Blue Pools & Spas, 374 P.3d 1064, 1066–67 (Utah Ct. App. 
2016). 
 131  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 21 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1981). 
 132  Id. § 205. 
 133  Id. § 205, cmt. d. 
 134  23 Williston on Contracts § 63:22 (4th ed. 1993).  
20https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol67/iss1/9
2019] SMART CONTRACTS AND TRADITIONAL CONTRACT LAW, OR 87 
 
Certainly, there are other contract doctrines, such as the doctrine of mistake, that 
could potentially have application here. But, thinking about the applicability of the 
implied duty of good faith in this context reveals something more about traditional 
contract law’s application here than the relatively straightforward observation that it 
is sufficiently flexible to be applied in principled ways in this new technological 
context. As The DAO demonstrates, the humans responsible for converting 
agreements into code are, themselves, fallible both on account of the likelihood that 
they will make mistakes from time to time, and on account of the fact that the ability 
to convert agreements into code does nothing to solve the bounded rationality of those 
who are responsible for devising the terms of these agreements in the first place. 
Traditional contract law, as well as doctrinal areas that are, at their core, specific 
applications of contractual principles to particular types of relationships (e.g., 
partnership law) deal with these issues, in part, with gap filling terms like the implied 
duty of good faith and fair dealing.135 There is some irony here—the consequences of 
the DAO organizers’ attempt to opt-in to an extra-legal framework for the relationship 
between and among holders of DAO tokens and other participants in the enterprise are 
arguably best addressed by the legal framework that they attempted to disclaim.    
At the beginning of this discussion, I noted that there are a variety of issues that 
would confront litigants actually attempting to bring a claim related to The DAO 
meltdown. Jurisdictional questions, standing, and the need to correlate real-world 
identities are all potential roadblocks when it comes to enforcing smart contracts as 
legal contracts.136 Blockchain and smart contracts do threaten to eliminate “legal 
intervention points,”137 and it may very well be that the emergence of both practical 
roadblocks to actually filing litigation, and the availability of non-legal substitutes for 
legal intervention points, prevent contract law from providing the primary framework 
under which disputes over smart contracts are decided. Nevertheless, as long as there 
are identifiable individuals or entities involved, the possibility of legal intervention 
remains,138 and the need to understand the application of traditional legal doctrines to 
smart contracts and blockchain more generally will grow. As I hope this Essay has 
shown, the traditional law of contracts has already confronted many of the underlying 
issues that smart contracting presents and will provide legal decision-makers tasked 
with applying that body of law with a robust and flexible set of tools with which it will 
be possible to reach a variety of results.  
V. CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, I would like to offer a suggestion about the nature of the challenges 
that will be involved in the effort to incorporate smart contracts into the law. No doubt, 
large regulatory questions will require well-reasoned and nuanced responses. Some of 
these may require making largescale changes to existing legal regimes or, potentially, 
creating completely new legal doctrines. When it comes to the law of contracts, 
however, it seems like the nature of the challenge will be different. In the hands of 
judges, traditional contract law has been sufficiently flexible to handle a variety of 
technological innovations up to this point. Shrinkwrap contracts, Internet contracting, 
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and the rise of email and other methods of electronic communications as a way of 
conducting bilateral negotiations all come to mind. As legal decision-makers are 
tasked with deciding the disputes that will be responsible for incorporating smart 
contracts into the law of contracts, it may be that the main challenges will be ensuring 
that they are sufficiently equipped with the knowledge they need about the technology 
and the way it functions—both more generally and in an application specific way—to 
apply these doctrines in sensible ways to result in a coherent body of law that provides 
the certainty and predictive ability that commercial actors require.  
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